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Abstract
The role of a specific institution in avoiding a "tragedy of the commons"
situation in a common pool-resource environment is studied experimentally.
The resource users privately decide their own exploitation level and then,
once the group outcome is revealed, can choose to select other individuals
for inspection. At a cost, the inspector can view the decision of any
individual. If the inspected individual has exploited the resource excessively,
relative to a publicly known amount, a fine is imposed and paid to the
inspector. The rules, called Carte di Regola, were modeled after an historical
case of self-governed rural communities.  The impact of the rules is a
dramatic increase in efficiency over the no rule case but still less than 100%.
As part of an attempt to understand the nature of the impact of the rules
the paper focuses on models of individual agent’s choices. The patterns of
results relative to the classical Nash model are similar to other experiments.
The model does well, except for the fact that contributions to the public
good are less than Nash equilibrium amount. However, when the
environment is changed to allow sanctions, contributions above the Nash
equilibrium are observed. This paradoxical “flip” in behavior is explained by
a non classical model in which spite plays a role in preferences and in which
agents are heterogeneous. The model of asymmetric, other regarding agents
also does relatively well in predicting patterns of individual choices such as
the choice to inspect and sanction others. Efficiency is improved along with
the strength of sanctions and the patterns of individual choices are
consistent with the non classical model.
1KEEPING AN EYE ON YOUR NEIGHBORS:
AGENTS MONITORING AND SANCTIONING ONE ANOTHER
IN A COMMON-POOL RESOURCE ENVIRONMENT
Marco Casari and Charles R. Plott
INTRODUCTION*
     The public choice and public economics literature has revealed many different fabrics of
institutions applied to the management of social dilemma situations. This study provides some
insights about the nature of decentralized enforcement of rules or customs in the sense that
members of the society monitor one another’s actions and implement sanctions in those cases in
which the actions are deemed unacceptable.  Several such institutions can be identified in the
literature, which, on the surface, seem similar but close examination in light of theory suggests
possibly dramatic differences in their impact on public performance. The broad questions posed by
the study are related to the relative effectiveness and efficiency of the different forms that such
institutions might take.  Experiments are designed for a common-pool resource environment and
the results are reported.
     The general class of institutions is one in which individual actions can be monitored at a cost and
then sanctions can be imposed if the actions are deemed inappropriate.  For the most part the
monitoring is decentralized or self-administered in the sense that the agents themselves have the
capacity to observe or monitor the actions of other agents. The class of institutions has as a
common purpose the enforcement of cooperation.  However, the institutions differ according to the
circumstances under which sanctions can be administered, the level of the sanctions and the possible
rewards to those who do successful monitoring.  The particular institution studied, motivated by a
historical case of forest and pasture management in the Italian alps (Casari, 1997), will be called the
                                                     
* The financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political
Science is gratefully acknowledged. We are also deeply appreciative of the collaboration of Stephen Van Hooser who
developed the software program and helped extensively with the experiments. Many thanks to Anthony Kwasnica,
Alvaro Gonzalez Staffa, Leslie Title, Roberto Weber, Angela Hung, and Peter Coughlan for their suggestions and help in
running the experiments. Thanks also to William Morrison, David M. Messick, and Giangiacomo Bravo for the
suggestions, James Walker for providing a copy of the instructions of their experiment, and to Robert Moir for his
contribution to Table 1. This work has benefited from the comments of the participants at the 1999 ESA annual
meeting, at a seminar at the University of Trento, Italy, and at the 2000 IASCP conference. The usual disclaimer applies.
2Carte di Regola, taken from the name of the documents where the rules were written.  No doubt,
similar institutions can be found in many forms.  For example, Varian (1990) reports the case of the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, where potential borrowers mutually monitor each others projects to
ensure the success of the financed enterprise.  Field accounts of sanction systems in common-pool
resource management can be found in Bromley (1992).
     Laboratory methods have been applied many times to gain a better understanding of the complex
social arrangements that might be useful as environmental safeguards.   In the light of previous
experimental work the aim of the paper is twofold.  The first is to study the robustness of the results
reported in an important experimental contribution by Walker, Gardner and Ostrom (WGO, 1990).
The phenomena they report from common-pool resource experiments without sanctions exhibit a
type of inconsistency with public goods experiments that we will call “the spite/altruist paradox”.
The inconsistency invites replication and further investigation.
     The second purpose of this paper is to study the influence of the self-financed monitoring and
sanctioning institution represented by the Carte di Regola.  The question posed is related to its
influence on the efficiency of resource use.  The economic environments implemented in the
experiments are reviewed in Section 2.  The spite/altruist paradox that motivates part of the study is
introduced in Section 3. Experimental procedures are outlined in Section 4.  Theory and the
productions of the two major models are outlined in Section 5 and Section 6.  Predictions from the
models for the various treatments, including designs with and without sanctions, are outlined.  The
results of experiments without sanctions are presented in Section 7 followed by the results of
experiments with sanctions in Section 8 and Section 9.  The conclusions follow in Section 10.
2. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The environment consists of a group of agents where each agent i=1,..,N chooses her individual
use level, xi, of a common-pool resource between a lower limit of zero (i.e. not using the common-
pool resource) and a given upper limit xˆ . Using the resource involves a costly effort that is captured
by the linear cost variable v. The payoff of agent i, πi , is:
 πi = v⋅(Ei - xi) + 
x
X
i  ⋅f(X) where X = ∑ i =1,...,N  xi  and  xi∈[0, xˆ ] with i=1,…, N (1)
Aside from the parameters in the function f(X), which yields the total flow of revenues from the
common-pool resource, the only parameters of the problem are the endowment Ei and the cost
3variable v.  In a sense the variable v can be viewed as the opportunity cost given by the returns to
investments in some sort of private activity instead than in the common-pool resource. For instance,
a peasant can earn a fixed salary as an employee, or raise his own cattle on the common pasture, or
allocate part of his time to both activities. The endowment Ei determines the earnings of the subject
when she chooses not to use the common-pool resource. Within each experiment it will be the same
across all agents.1
<    Figure 1 about here    >
The group revenues f(X) increase in X up to a maximal point and then decrease. What matters
to the group are the revenues once the opportunity cost of the alternative activity is subtracted, Π =
f(X) -vX . The payoff of agent i, πi , can be depicted as her share of Π, and this share is proportional
to her individual use relative to the group (
x
X
i ).
     As is well known, without proper incentives the use of the common pool resource can result in
the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968). Figure 1 illustrates this idea. If the group use is at the
socially optimal level, X0, an agent has an incentive to change action. The earnings of an individual
increase as her level of xi increases because the individual appropriates a larger share of Π. This
action imposes a negative externality on the group because Π becomes smaller than before. A
fisherman who over-fishes today, for instance, will reduce the tomorrow’s catch for him and for his
peers. The unstructured interaction of N self-interested agents will lead to an excessive use of the
common resource2. This general framework models many situations such as the exploitation of
renewable resource, the use of a shared central computer, and the Cournot competition in an
oligopoly3.
3. THE SPITE/ALTRUIST PARADOX AND SANCTIONING SYSTEMS
                                                     
1  The two variables E (endowment) and xˆ  (upper limit in the individual use of the common-pool resource) can be
modified independently. In the WGO(1990) design a change in E necessarily affected xˆ .
2  As a terminology clarification, a free rider will over-use a common-pool resource while under-contribute in a public
good provision situation.
3 The payoff πi could be seen as the profits of an oligopolistic firm i that decides the quantity of goods xi to produce and
sell on the market. If we assume that the market demand is a linear function D = a - b⋅X and the technology has
constant returns to scale, i.e. the cost to produce a unit of the good is always v (E = 0), then the total revenues in the
market are  f(X) = a⋅X - b⋅X2 and the share of the revenues that goes to firm i is proportional to its market share xi /X.
4This study is designed both to test the replicability of results reported in the literature and,
especially, to analyze the effects of a specific self-managed monitoring and sanctioning mechanism
in a common-pool resource environment.  The need for a test of replicability and robustness of
results in the literature follows from some perplexing results summarized below.  To this end a
baseline experiment is conducted with no sanctions. The parameters implemented for the baseline
experiment are similar to those used in other studies and were taken – with some adjustments –
from the experimental study by Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom, 1990 (WGO). The results they report
from a sanction-free environment can be summarized in two points4:
(1) The agents heavily over-use the resource at levels that go beyond what a pure free-riding
behavior would suggest; 5
(2) The pattern of individual use levels does not stabilize at the one-shot Nash equilibrium
These results are puzzling because in voluntary contributions public goods experiments agents
frequently exhibit cooperation levels in excess of the Nash equilibrium prediction (Andreoni, 1995
and Isaac, Walker and Williams, 1994) while WGO reports that in common-pool resource
experiments the cooperation level is below it. Because cooperation above Nash can be interpreted as
altruism and cooperation below Nash can be interpreted as spite, this phenomenon will be labeled
the “spite/ altruist paradox”.
This paradox emerging from the WGO experiments presented a challenge to not only replicate
their experiments but also to explore the robustness of the results they report. Several
methodological and procedural changes were introduced in the experiments that we report. The
monetary incentives were increased compared to the original study, by reducing the minimum safe
earning and raising four times the conversion rate between laboratory currency and dollars. The
instructions were rewritten and special software developed. Other parameter adjustments were made
to facilitate the understanding of the experiment by the subjects, such as re-scaling the action space.
A complete list of changes is included in Appendix A.
                                                     
4  Conclusion 2 is an interpretation given in Ostrom et al, 1994, p.117.In their study there is a third conclusion: the total
group appropriation exhibits a pulsing pattern across periods. Appropriation levels decayed and then rebounded
repeatedly in the same experiment. A similar phenomenon was reported in Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985). When the
idea of ‘pulsing patterns’ is operationalized into precise indexes, we find systematically lower values in our no sanction
experiments compared to theirs. Having said that, we don’t have any benchmark to state that our results did or did not
exhibit pulsing patterns.
5 The excessive use efforts were particularly impressive when the maximum potential effort of the agents, Nx, was very
high in relation to the Nash equilibrium use level (about three times as much). Recall that xˆ  is the upper limit on xi, and
was the same for all agents. Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom (1990) test two designs with different ratios of Nash
5While the spite/altruist paradox is important, the primary focus on this study is on a special
institutional arrangement for guiding decisions regarding common-pool resources called the Carte di
Regola . The Carte di Regola was part of the organization of rural communities in a mountain region of
Northern Italy, where a sanctioning mechanism was in place to limit overexploitation of the village
forests and pastures (Casari, 1997). The Carte di Regola institutions survived for more than six
centuries. Both the conditions under which a sanction could be inflicted and the amount of the fine
were specified in advance in written documents. The village court would sentence people who used
the common resource above an established limit to pay a fine proportional to the severity of the
damage inflicted to the community. A share of such fine usually went to the prosecutor. Any villager
could report a violation but he usually incurred a cost in the form of a monitoring effort to discover
the free rider and additional costs to bring him to court.
Formal sanctioning systems are often adopted by groups to keep the excessive use of a
common resource under control (Ostrom, 1990). Table 1 offers a detailed break down of the
features of monitoring and sanctioning institutions and illustrates the characteristics of the specific
institutions studied in the experimental literature. In most systems the group outcome is common
knowledge and monitoring enables the agents to observe the individual actions of other agents. An
inspection involves both a monitoring action and a sanctioning action. Sanctioning enables an agent
to reduce the payoff of other group members who deviate from agreed upon rules of behavior.
Systems typically studied in the literature are defined by the following two features. First, the action
of punishing is a loss for both the person who inflicts it and for the one targeted by it. Sanctions
constitute a complete deadweight loss for the group. Secondly, the more an agent is willing to pay for
sanctioning the harsher the punishment inflicted. An example is the damage that a member of a
village inflicts overnight to the nets of a fellow fisherman.
<    Table 1 about here    >
Some notation is needed to facilitate the comparison of the experimental designs and results
that are found in the literature. A sanction system is characterized by a reward parameter ϑ, that
measures the amount of punishment inflicted (s) relative to the cost to request a sanction (c, ϑ≡s/c,
                                                                                                                                                                          
equilibrium over the endowment. In the high endowment case (the one that we have replicated here, xˆ =50) the ratio is
0.32 and in the other case (with xˆ =20) is 0.64.
6where c, s > 0. The three studies of self-administered sanctions found in the literature (Ostrom at
al, 1994; Moir, 1998; Fehr and Gatcher, 1999) have the following common results6:
(1) Agents do request sanctions. The agent who requests a sanction will incur in a loss because
c>0 and such behavior is incompatible with purely self-interested motives according to one-
stage Nash strategies. 7
(2) The lower the reward ϑ from sanctioning, the less frequent sanctions are requested. Agents
are responsive to the cost of sanctioning and to the magnitude of the impact of sanctions on
other people’s earnings.
(3) Gross group earnings (or rent) Π increase. Free riding behavior is more often targeted than
cooperative behavior. 8
(4) Net group earnings do not always increase. Net group earnings comes from gross group
earnings Π minus the sanctioning fees c. Ostrom et al (1994) report a net loss while Moir
(1998) and Fehr and Gratchen (1999) find a slight gain.
The Carte di Regola sanction system presents two fundamental differences with the other sanction
systems:
• The punishment (s) is a transfer of money from the targeted agent to the inspector. Hence
inspecting is profitable when the fine is higher than the sanctioning fee (c), which remains a
deadweight loss for the group.
• The punishment needs to fit the crime and does not depend upon the will of the inspector. In
the specific case, the agent inspected pays a fine only if he used more than a publicly known
level and the fine is proportional to his excessive use.
                                                     
6 Other studies have been not included in the review either because they have an external sanctioning authority
(Beckenkamp and Ostmann, 1999, Cardenas et al, 1999) or because the experimental design is for other reasons too
different from ours (Yamagishi, 1988; McCusker and Carnevale, 1995). Experiments with external sanctioning
authorities reports a less succesful story in raising group efficiency. The authors attributes at least part of the modest
performances to the psychological distance between the users and the sanctioning authority.
7 In a social sanction system the best action of a self-interested agent is not to request sanctions at all. Experimentally,
the use of sanctions might simply be the result of a trembling hand behavior or plain confusion. As it will become clear,
in the Carte di Regola sanction system the equilibrium can be moved away from the border of the action space.
8 Why are free riders more often targeted than cooperators? Because targeting free riders is oftentimes more rewarding
than targeting cooperators. Of course this feature depends upon the experimental design. While this assumption is
correct for this study and for Fehr and Gatcher (1999) (although they do not spell out this point) it is not for Ostrom et
al (1994) and Moir(1998). For more on this point see discussion in the conclusions.
7There are two additional features of the Carte di Regola that are different from the sanctioning
systems found in other studies.  An agent can be convicted only once for the same violation. In
other words, there is no cumulating of sanctions that are requested by different agents on the same
action. An inspection involves at the same time information discovery as well as punishment.
Secondly, the individual actions are unknown before requesting the inspection: monitoring and
sanctioning occur at the same time9.
4. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
A total of 56 subjects were recruited from the campus of the California Institute of Technology
for a total of 10 experimental sessions. The different treatments are outlined in Table 2. There are
three different sanctioning designs: No Sanction, Weak Sanction, and Strong Sanction and two
different levels of subject experience with common-pool resource experiments: Inexperienced and
Experienced. In the sanction treatments any subject has the option of selecting other individuals for
inspection after she has privately decided her own exploitation level. At a cost, the inspector can
view the decision of any individual. If the inspected individual has exploited the resource excessively,
relative to a publicly known amount, a fine is imposed and paid to the inspector. In the strong
sanction design the unitary fine is four times higher than in the weak sanction treatment and the
definition of excessive resource use is stricter. Within each treatment, half of the experiments were
conducted with inexperienced subjects and the other half with experienced subjects.
<    Table 2 about here    >
There were 8 subjects in each experimental session. All subjects were seated at terminals,
separated by partitions, and assigned identification numbers. No communication was allowed.
Instructions were read aloud to everyone (instructions are reported in Appendix B). The
experiments were run on networked personal computers using dedicated software for Netscape.
       Each subject faced a decision about the level of effort to put in the appropriation of a common-
pool resource (or, simply, in the use of the resource), where that effort had a linear cost and the
resource yielded non-linear revenues. The use level ranged from zero to a maximum level and was
                                                     
9 In the simplified version for the laboratory, the inspection fee is the analogous of procedural costs in the Carte di Regola
system and the entire fine is transferred to the prosecutor. In our experiment, the verdict of the court is always supposed
to be correct and the identity of the prosecutors is not revealed. Moreover, there is no communication face to face.
8chosen without knowing the choices of the other subjects. Use levels were expressed in “ tokens”
and payoffs were in terms of “francs” (an artificial laboratory currency with a publicly known dollar-
exchange rate) and in dollars. A constant unitary cost was charged to the subjects for every token
used as an opportunity cost for the appropriation effort. The gross group return  f(X) from the market
depended in a non-linear fashion on the sum of the uses X of all the subjects and was first
increasing and than decreasing in X. The individual return consisted of a share of the total group
return corresponding to the fraction of the individual use xi on the group use X.
Each subject was paid privately in cash immediately following the experiment. An experiment
lasted from 1 hour to 2 hours and 20 minutes including the preliminaries (instructions, questions
and answers, quiz, and practice rounds).  Individual earnings ranged from $5.80 to $53.10.
An experiment consisted of a number of periods from 27 to 33 and each period consisted of
just one step in the no sanction treatment and of two steps in the sanctioning treatments. During
step one, the computer screen prompted a request for a number of tokens that the subject wished to
put in the market. A subject could digit any real number between 0 and 50. After everybody
completed the input, the software displayed the group outcome (total group use and gross group
return). At this point, in the no sanction treatment subjects could also see their individual period
payoff (your share of gross, cost of tokens, period payoff), while in the sanctioning treatments this
part was postponed until the end of step two. Step two gave a chance to inspect other subjects. By
clicking on a box next to the subject identification number, a subject could ask to uncover the use
level of any number of subjects from 0 to 7. A fee was charged for every inspection and the eventual
fines collected were credited to the inspectors. After everybody had taken this decision, the period
results were displayed.
     The period payoff was computed and explained in terms of its three components: result of use
decisions, result of inspections asked, and notices of the eventual charge for an inspection targeting
the subject. In case more than one subject asked to inspect the same person, a random device would
pick only one inspector and cancel the requests of the others. At this point, the use level of the
subjects inspected during that period became public information. The software was designed in a
way that a history record of the decisions always appeared on the computer screen. Subjects could
see their past individual uses, their individual cumulative payoff, the past total group uses, the past
gross group returns, and the past uncovered use levels of subjects inspected.
To ensure that the rules were well understood we adopted the following procedure. First, the
rules were publicly explained in detail and with examples. Second, a quiz was given. All the correct
9answers were read aloud after completion of the quiz and the ones where mistakes were noticed in
the answers were further explained. Third, two practice periods were run, to help the subjects
familiarize themselves with the rules of the experiment and with the software. After the two practice
rounds, a number of periods from 27 to 33 were run. Subjects were not told the number of rounds
that were to take place. At the end of the third-before-the-last period, an announcement was made
that the experiment was going to end in two periods. After the experiment was over, a questionnaire
was submitted to the subjects asking for the strategy they followed.
5. CLASSICAL MODEL
In this section we compute the Nash equilibrium of the model under the three sanction designs
– no sanctions, weak sanctions, strong sanctions - using a standard model of homogeneous, self-
interested agents. We will refer to it as the classical model. We assume that the agents are risk neutral
and that the preferences of all the agents are common knowledge.
5.1. NO-SANCTION DESIGN
The payoff function of a self-interested agent i in the no-sanction design is:
πi = v⋅(e - xi) + 
x
X
i  ⋅ (aX – bX2)   where   X=Σi xi   is the group use (1´ )
The best response function is a linear function of the use level of everybody else (Figure 2),
x xi j
j i
N
−
≠
= ∑ : x a v
b
xi i*=
−
−
−2
1
2
           where xi* is bounded to be in [0, 50] (2)
The efficiency of an outcome is defined by its corresponding group earnings relative to the
maximum theoretical group earnings. Efficiency is 100% at the socially optimal level and 0% at the
open access level. In an open access situation the resource is available for the use of anybody and
the equilibrium is computed as the use in the limit when the number of appropriators goes to
infinity. The Nash equilibrium value for a group of N agents is in-between the social optimal and the
open access levels (see Figure 1 for an illustration). To use a market analogy, the three situations
correspond to a monopoly, Cournot oligopoly, and perfect competition situation.
<    Figure 2 about here    >
Proposition 1A. (RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY WITHOUT SANCTIONS)
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Under the parameters of the experiment without a sanctioning institution, the Nash
equilibrium outcome with homogeneous, self-interested agents has an efficiency of 39.5% of
the optimal level [X=128].
All the agents will use the resource at an identical rate of 16 tokens.
When agents are identical, the Nash equilibrium outcome is  Ni
bN
va
xi ,...,1)1(
=∀
+
−
=  that -
given the parameter values N=8, a=23/2, v=2.5, b=1/16 - corresponds to an individual use of
xi=16 and to a total group use of X=128. The socially optimal outcome is at X=72 and could be
obtained if all the eight agents in the group choose 9 tokens. The efficiency of the Nash equilibrium
is 39.5% with reference to the maximum potential earnings Π=324 (where the endowment is set to
zero, E=0). At the open access use level of X=144 (xi=18) the net group return is equal to just the
period endowment, which implies a complete destruction of the potentially positive incomes that
the group could have made out of the common-pool resource (Π=0).
5.2. WEAK SANCTION DESIGN
In the sanction treatments each period has a use and an inspection phases. Once the total group
use is revealed, agent i might ask to inspect any other agent j (Iij=1 when an inspection is requested,
Iij=0 otherwise, i≠j). Agent i pays a fee k for every inspection carried out and a transfer sj from agent
j to agent i is made. The transfer sj is proportional to the use of agent j in excess of a threshold of  λ
tokens. The total revenues from inspections for agent i are ri= ∑j=1N   Ii jrij   , where:
rij = sj   -  k    and    sj =  0 ,  xj ≤ λ
     h⋅( xj  - λ) ,  xj >λ
The parameter h is the unitary fine for each extra token used and measures the stiffness of the
punishment. Sanctions modify the incentives for use because they threat to increase the cost of
using the common-pool resource above a given limit of λ tokens. In Figure 2, sanctions would
induce a downward shift in the best response function of a targeted agent. The degree of the shift
depends on the perceived probability pi that an agent has of being inspected. If such probability is
zero for all the agents, the incentive structure is identical to the no sanction one but if it is strictly
positive for some agent, her best response is to use the resource less than in the corresponding no
inspection case:
11
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Proposition 2A. (RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY WITH  WEAK  SANCTIONS)
When agents are homogeneous and self-interested, the introduction of weak sanctions will
not change the classical Nash equilibrium level stated in proposition 1A (because no
sanction will be requested).
Proposition 3A. (INSPECTION BEHAVIOR WITH  WEAK  SANCTIONS)
When weak sanctions are introduced, at the Nash equilibrium inspections pay zero and thus
agents are indifferent. However, if a slight psychological cost exists no inspection will be
requested by homogeneous, self-interested agents.
When weak sanctions are in place (k=7, λ=9, h=1), the symmetric Nash equilibrium in the
resource use phase and in the inspection phase ranges in X*∈ [113.7, 128] - or equivalently
xi*∈[14.2, 16] - depending on the probability of agent j of being inspected pj. What determines pj ?.
Agent i will inspect another agent j if it is profitable to do so, rij > 0, and this situation occurs when
the use level of agent j is high enough to generate a sufficiently large sanction to cover the inspection
fee k=7, i.e.  λ+>
h
k
x j =16.
It is important to note that weak sanctions have no effect on group outcomes. That is, if all
agents are identical and self-interested and if that fact is common knowledge, then the total group
use will not change from the no sanction design level and there will be no inspection. In other
words, the classical Nash equilibrium outcome is (X*, p*)=(128, 0) because no inspection will be
profitable as long as X≤128 and agents are symmetric (pi=p ∀i). As stated in proposition 1A, in
equilibrium agents have no incentive to use the resource more than X=128 even without the
possibility of sanctioning. When X>128 the inspection of each one of the agents will be profitable.
The number of requests to inspect agents will be zero before X=128 and jump to N(N-1) (i.e. 56 for
N=8) after that point..10
                                                     
10  The equilibrium X*=128, p*=0 is slightly altered when the agents have a ”trembling hand” in their inspecting
decisions. If a subject inspects “by accident” and this kind of events is common knowledge the equilibrium will be below
X=128. We believe that this point affects neither our basic results nor our conclusions.
12
5.3. STRONG SANCTION DESIGN
The weak sanction design described above does not alter the equilibrium outcome of the no
sanction design. The inspecting device simply puts stronger incentives to discourage over-use, which
is not in the agents’ self interest anyway. On the contrary, the strong sanction design has the explicit
purpose to move the equilibrium away from the inefficient equilibrium of the no sanction treatment
to an efficient equilibrium.
Proposition 4A (RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY WITH  STRONG  SANCTIONS)
When agents are homogeneous and self-interested, the introduction of strong sanctions will
move the Nash equilibrium outcome very close to the socially optimal level [above 99%
efficiency, X=71.1].
Proposition 5A. (INSPECTION BEHAVIOR WITH  STRONG  SANCTIONS)
When strong sanctions are introduced, all agents will inspect everybody.
There are many ways to modify the inspection parameters k, h, λ in order to move the
equilibrium to the socially optimal point of X=72.  The inspection fee is a technological parameter
that represents ideally the degree of difficulty in observing other people’s actions and was not
changed (k=7). Instead the institutional parameters h and λ were adjusted, by inflicting stronger
punishments for violations of stricter individual quotas (h =4, λ=7).
For the new set of parameters, the equilibrium group use ranges in X*∈ [71.1, 128] - or
equivalently xi*∈[8.9, 16] - depending on the inspection probability p. Inspecting an agent is
profitable when xi> 8.75. If agents are symmetric, no inspection will be profitable unless X>70. In
the new symmetric equilibrium (X*, p*)=(71.1, 1) all the agents are inspected and the group
efficiency is at 99.97%. The total group use X* is slightly lower than the social optimal value in order
to assign integer numbers to the parameter values to facilitate the agents in the computations. The
difference in terms of efficiency is, however, negligible.
6. A MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS, OTHER-REGARDING AGENTS
13
In this section we outline a simple model where an agent’s payoff depends not only on personal
earnings but also on the earnings of the other people in the group and then compute the Nash
equilibrium of the model.  This class of models appears both in some of the early texts of the
classical and marginalist schools (Smith, 1759; Edgeworth, 1881) and in more recent experimental
works (Krebs, 1970; Rabin, 1993; Ito et al, 1995; Chan et al, 1997; Levine, 1997; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 1999; Saijo, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, in press;). The recent, growing interest in these
models stems from a realization that  “ pure self interest is clearly not a fully adequate description of
human motivation.  Realism suggests that economists should move away from the presumption that
people are motivated solely by self interest” (Rabin, 1996). Rabin (1996) cites an extensive body of
experimental research where people exhibit pattern of not self-interested behavior.
The specific shape of other-regarding preferences presented in this section intends to capture in
a parsimonious way a component that is believed to motivate human behavior.
MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS, OTHER-REGARDING AGENTS
Ui(πi, Π-i) = πi + γi Π-i      (3) γi >0 Altruistic agent    Π-i=Σj≠iπj
γi =0 Self-interested agent    γi ∈[-1,+1]
γi <0 Spiteful agent
Self-interest is a special case of the model (γi =0). In general, agent i is willing to give up $1 of
personal earnings (πi ) in order to see the other people’s earnings (Π-i) changed by 1/ γi dollars. A
positive value in the other-regarding parameter γi denotes an altruistic attitude toward the group,
while a negative value denotes a spiteful attitude. A spiteful agent will find enjoyment in decreasing the
earnings of others and therefore she is willing to use some of her personal earnings in order for that to
happen. The degree of altruism or spite is bounded in a way that nobody will choose to pay more
than $1 to modify the group earnings by less than $1. Although not crucial for the conclusions, we
think that this assumption of γi ∈[-1, +1] is reasonable. The definition of spite we have given is
similar to the one adopted by Levine (1997) and Saijo (2000) but different to the concept of envy
suggested by Mui (1995). The model (3) does not incorporate any reciprocity nor equity nor fairness
considerations.
Agents in a group are assumed in general to be heterogeneous. In other words, the agents are
assumed to care about others’ earnings to different degrees γi and, in particular, groups are assumed
to have at least two agents i, k that are different,  γk ≠  γi .  As in the classical model, agents are
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assumed to be risk neutral and the preferences of all the agents common knowledge. Expression (3)
is referred as the model with heterogeneous, other-regarding agents.
The remaining of this section is devoted to the computation of the Nash equilibrium in the
three designs11. The payoff function for agent i in the no sanction design is now:
πi = v⋅(e - xi) + 
x
X
i  ⋅ (aX – bX2) + γi [v⋅((N-1)e – X-i) + 
X
X i−  ⋅ (aX – bX2)] (1’’)
where X=Σi xi , X-i=Σj≠i xj  .  The best response function is:
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  , where xi* is bounded to be in [0, 50].  (2’’)
Proposition 1B. (RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY WITHOUT SANCTIONS)
Without a sanctioning institution the Nash equilibrium with heterogeneous, other-regarding
agents depends upon the preference structure of the agents. For instance:
-  When all agents are altruistic, group efficiency will be better than the classical Nash.
-  When all agents are spiteful, group efficiency will be worse than the classical Nash.
In general, individual agents will use the resource at a different rates, with spiteful agents
using it more than altruistic agents.
In the no sanction environment (N=8, a=23/2, v=2.5, b=1/16), The symmetric Nash equilibria
of the model range in X*∈[72, 400] that corresponds to an efficiency interval [–321%, 100%]
depending on the value of the other-regarding parameter vector γ. For illustrative purposes, if all
agents are homogeneous and altruistic with γi =1/7 then the Nash equilibrium is X*=115.2, while if
they are all identically spiteful with γi = - 1/7, then X*=144 12. With heterogeneous preferences the
                                                     
11 To simplify computation, we assume that the vector of other-regarding parameters γ is such that the individual
response function is within the interval xi∈[0,50]. This assumption might further restrict the range of  γ to a subset of
the [-1, +1] interval.
12 With all self-interested agents γi =0 the outcome is the same as in the classical model, namely X*=128. If all the agents
are homogeneous, the group appropriation level with other-regarding agents is X*=72 with completly altruistic agents (γi
= 1) and is X*=400 with completely spiteful agents (γi =- 1). The model has of course also asymmetric Nash equilibria,
which depend upon the individual preferences within the group. For instance, when half of the agents are altruistic γi
=1/7 and half are spiteful γi = - 1/7 (symmetrically heterogeneous preferences) the group outcome is X*=126 and the
individual appropriation levels will be x i =0  and x i =31.5 respectively.
An interesting case is when the preferences in the group are symmetrically heterogeneous or, in other words, for every
altruistic agent i with γi >0 there is a spiteful agent k with γk=- γi . The Nash equilibrium with symmetrically
heterogeneous agents is in general more efficient than the classical Nash equilibrium (39.5%).
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outcome is still in the range indicated above but there is no longer a one-to-one correspondence
between a group outcome X* and a unique vector of agent preferences.
With heterogeneous preferences also the individual use levels are heterogeneous. In particular,
the lower the other-regarding parameter γi, the higher the individual use xi is: spiteful agents use the
resource more than self-interested agents and self-interested agents use it more than altruistic ones.
Proposition 2B.  (RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY WITH WEAK SANCTIONS)
When agents are heterogeneous and other-regarding, the introduction of weak sanctions will
improve upon the Nash equilibrium level without sanctions stated in proposition 1B.
If two or more agents are not altruistic (sufficient condition), the improvement will be strict
and inequality in the individual use of the resource will decrease relative to the no sanction
design.
When a group is heterogeneous and other-regarding, agents use the resource at different rates
(proposition 1B) and in particular at least one non-altruistic agent uses the resource above xi=16. If
there are two or more non-altruistic agents, that action will be inspected when information is
perfect. This threat being sanctioned gives an incentive to lower the use level of the resource. As a
consequence, the group use rate decreases and the welfare improves compare to the no-sanction
environment.
Under the threat of sanctions, the best response function of an agent i with other-regarding
preferences is:
( ) ( )
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   ,  if xj >λ (4’ )
Spiteful agents are particularly sensitive to the threat of sanctions because the money that is taken
away from them is given to somebody else while altruistic agents care less about sanctions precisely
because of this fact. Sanctions induce spiteful agents to lower their use level proportionally more
than altruistic agents. In particular in the weak sanction design (h =1, λ=9, k=7), the inequalities in
use levels within the group will be reduced, although spiteful agents will still use the resource more
than altruistic agents will.13
Proposition 3B. (INSPECTION BEHAVIOR WITH WEAK SANCTIONS)
                                                     
13 Individual earning inequalities from resource use (excluding revenues from the inspection activity) will also decrease in
the periods where the earnings of the group are non-negative,  f(X)-vX=0 (i.e. X≤144).
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When weak sanctions are introduced,
(i)  There will be a positive number of inspections if two or more agents are not altruistic
(sufficient condition)
(ii) The heavier users (the most spiteful agents) will be more aggressive inspectors than
lighter users (the most altruistic agents) and will also purposively request non-profitable
inspections.
Agent i will inspect agent j when both ( ) λγ +−> ij h
k
x
1
  and xj >λ14. Inspection decisions are
affected by the value of the other-regarding parameter γi . In particular a spiteful agent i inspects for
lower values of xj than an altruistic agent does. The reason is that she finds enjoyment not only from
the cash flow of the fine but also from decreasing the income of some other agent. On the other
hand, an altruistic agent is concerned about the social loss constituted by the inspection fee k and
does not consider all the money of the fine si as a gain since it has been subtracted from somebody
else she cares about.  For instance, in the weak sanction treatment, a moderately spiteful agent with
γi =-1/7 will request an inspection for any  xj>15.1 (and lose money if xj<16) compared to a self-
interested agent who would do it only when xj>16. A moderately altruistic agent with γi =1/7 would
inspect only agents with xj>17.2. A completely altruistic agent (γi =1) will never inspect, while a
complete spiteful one inspects when xj>12.5. An implication of this examination is that when facing
the same use pattern, high users will be more aggressive inspectors than low users will.
The situation for unprofitable inspections can be reformulated using the terminology introduced in
section 3. The cost for the inspector is c=k-s and the damage inflicted is s. So in our other-regarding
model agent j will request the inspection if ϑ < -γj , where ϑ =s/c.
Proposition 4B. (RESOURCE USE EFFICIENCY WITH STRONG SANCTIONS)
When agents are heterogeneous and other-regarding, the introduction of strong sanctions
will shift the Nash equilibrium at an efficiency level above 98% of the socially optimal level
under some regularity conditions on preferences (X∈[64, 72]).
Proposition 5B. (INSPECTION BEHAVIOR WITH STRONG SANCTIONS)
                                                     
14 The payoff function of agent i when he can inflict a sanction on agent j is U^i(πi, Π-i) = U(πi , Π-i) +(sj – k) - γi sj. The
decision is to inspect when U^>U, or (sj – k) > γi sj,
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(i) When strong sanctions are introduced, all agents will be inspected under some
regularity conditions on preferences
(ii) Lighter users (the most spiteful agents) will be more aggressive inspectors than
heavier users (the most altruistic agents).
In a strong sanction environment (k=7, λ=7, h=4), the symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome is
in the range X*∈ [64, 72] - or equivalently xi*∈[8, 9] – when the probability of being inspected p is
set equal to 1. If all agents are completely altruistic (γi =1) the outcome will be socially optimal
(X=72, 100% efficiency) while if all agents are completely spiteful (γi =-1) the outcome will be
98.77% efficient (X=64).
In equilibrium the probability of agent j being inspected pj, is actually equal to one, under some
regularity conditions on preferences. A completely altruistic agent (γi =1) will never inspect while a
complete spiteful one inspects when xj>7.9. A sufficient condition on group preferences for all
actions to be inspected is that there are two or more non-altruistic agents and that the most spiteful
one is “not too far apart” from the next. More formally, when agents are ranked low to high other
regarding parameters γ(1), γ(2),…, γ(8), then γ(1), γ(2)≤0 and |γ(1) - γ(2)|< 0.25.15
In the weak sanction treatment spiteful agents still use more in absolute terms than altruistic
agents while with strong sanctions, the situation is reversed because of the stiffness of the sanctions:
the higher users are relatively more altruistic than the lower users. According to the heterogeneous,
other-regarding agent model, the lowest users will be more aggressive inspectors than the highest
users will.
7. RESULTS OF NO SANCTION EXPERIMENTS
The experimental results are compared with the predictions of the classical model  (1A) and of
the heterogeneous, other-regarding agent model (1B). The data demonstrate that the predictions of
the classical model in the no sanction environment are subject to systematic errors.  The other-
regarding agent model does better.
                                                     
15 This condition is  satisfied in three of the four no sanction experiments. The April 7 experiment satisfies a different
sufficient condition: No agent is very spiteful (γi>0.45 ∀i) and at least two agents are not altruistic (∃ i,j : γi  ,γi ≤0). The
above statements are based on the estimation describe in Paragraph 7 point (f).
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Result 1A. Without a sanctioning institution the resource is overused relative to the Nash
equilibrium with homogeneous, self-interested agents (‘classical’ Nash equilibrium). People
cooperate less than expected according to that model and are worse off than the model
predicts.
(i) Actual resource use is greater than the classical Nash equilibrium.
(ii) The phenomenon is not explained by learning or experience.
<    Table 3 about here    >
Support:
(i) In terms of efficiency the groups scored 28.4% of the maximum possible net return, a value
that is in-between the classical Nash equilibrium level of 39.5% and the open access level of
0%. The overall average of the group use for the four experiments was 131.3, which is
statistically different from both the above reference values at a 0.01 level16 (see Table 3 for
details). The group use varied considerably across periods, ranging from a minimum of 85.5 to a
maximum of 167 tokens.
(ii) Learning or experience effects do not alter the main conclusion that the group use is persistently
above the one-shot classical Nash equilibrium level. There is no support in the data for the
claim of temporary off-equilibrium outcomes due to learning or experience:
- Experienced subjects do not perform better than inexperienced subjects do.
Differences in efficiencies actually favor inexperienced subjects (25.2% versus 31.6%,
Figure 3).
- A comparison between the first half, second half, and after announcement period
averages17 show no statistical differences at 0.01 significance level. As an overall
average, the values are 131.37 in the first half, 131.39 in the second half, and 130.31
after the announcement (Figure 4).
The volatility of the group use level decreases over time in three out of four experiments (see
variance comparisons in Table 3) but it mostly reflects oscillations around the same average.
                                                                                                                                                                          
There is a much milder condition that ensures that at least 87.5%(i.e. 7/8) of the actions is inspected (It suffice that at
least one agent is not strongly altruistic, γ (1) <0.08).
16 The symmetric Nash equilibrium value X=128 was never recorded in any of the 129 rounds in which the
appropriation decisions were taken. The open access level is X=144.
17 In no sanction experiments, the first half includes periods 1-15, second half 16-30 (or 16-31), and after announcement
31-32 (or 32-33). In sanction treatment, the first half includes periods 1-12, second half 13-25 , and after announcement
26-27.
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<    Figure 3 about here    >
We can further analyze the evolution of group use over time. Agents know they are involved in
a repeated interaction and they are not told the number of rounds they will go through. The
probability that an additional round will be run decreases over time. If in the initial round agents can
support a better resource use than the one-shot Nash equilibrium, such level will move progressively
closer to the latter as the experiment unfolds. If a repeated interaction effect is present, the pattern
in the total group use should be
(a) A convergence to the one-shot Nash equilibrium from below, i.e. in the range X∈[72, 128);
(b) An eventual jump to the one-shot Nash equilibrium level after the end-of-experiment
announcement has been made.
The data show a weak support for (a) and no support for (b).
<    Figure 4 about here    >
The presence of a repeated interaction effect and of learning effects will be evaluated by the
application on the data of the Ashenfelter-El Gamal model, which is described in Noussair et al
(1995). The model assumes that total group use may start from a different origin for each
experiment, but the convergence is assumed to be a common asymptote in all four experiments.
Formally the model is as follows: 
Xmt = B11 D1 
t
1  + B12 D2 
t
1  + B13 D3 
t
1  + B14 D4 
t
1  + B2 
t
t 1− + umt
Where m is the index of the experiment; Dk are dummy variables that take value 1 if m=k and value
0 otherwise; t is time measured in terms of experimental period number; Xmt is the total group use in
period t of experiment m. B1m measures origin of the group use convergence process, and B2 is an
asymptote. Data in Table 3 show the estimation of the model.
The asymptote for the no sanction experiments is 134.0, which is statistically different from the
equilibrium level of 128 but not significantly different from the overall average group use of 131.3 at
a 0.05 level. This result confirms once more that the overuse of the resource persists and does not
tend to die out. The convergence to the asymptote starts from below for all the experiments.
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Result 1B. A model of heterogeneous, other regarding agents is compatible with the
resource use data in a sanction-free environment better than the classical model both at the
aggregate and the individual levels.  Furthermore, some clues exist in the data suggesting that
heterogeneity is an appropriate modification to the classical model. Specifically,
(i) Over use and under use are properties of individuals. About 37% of the agents are
      other-regarding and most of them are spiteful.
(ii) Self-reported other-regarding preferences are documented
Support:  The observed level of group use can be explained by the heterogeneous, other-regarding
agent model given an appropriate pattern of group preferences that is biased toward spite18.
Individual actions are very dispersed relative to the classical individual Nash equilibrium xi=16
(a) and this variability is due to individual heterogeneity (b). Individual heterogeneity is not a
consequence of confusion (c) but is consistent over time (d) and is due to other-regarding
preferences (e), (f).
(a)  The patterns of individual use do not conform to the one-shot classical Nash equilibrium
prediction. The actions within a 25% bandwidth around the prediction (i.e. in the interval [14,
18]) account for 15.7% of all the actions19 and the rest are not symmetrically distributed around
that value: about 61% are below and 23.3% are above. The mean is 16.42 and the standard
deviation is 10.00.
 (b)  A brief look at the individual average use levels makes clear that agents are heterogeneous and
that only a few agents were accountable for a systematic over-use (Figure 5). We can reject the
hypothesis that the agent average use is at the individual symmetric Nash equilibrium (xi=16)
for 28 out of 32 agents at 0.05 level (see white bars in Figure 5). Within each experiment there
are at least four different types of agents whom use behavior is statistically different at 0.05
level. The presence of different types of individuals is a common finding in the experimental
literature (Von Winden, Dijk, Sonnemans, 1998)
(c)   There are reasons to believe that the differences in individual behavior are traits of the agents
and are not due to confusion. The experimental design was not simple and a possible
explanation of such behavior is that the “ heavy users” might have been confused subjects who
                                                     
18 Consider for example a group with three types of agents: two are moderately altruistic γi =1/21, four self-interested
agents, and two quite spiteful ones γi =- ¼. The group appropriation is X*=132 with individual appropriations xi of 6,
12, and 36 respectively.
19 The actions exactly at xi=16 are 26 (2.52%).
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did not properly understand the incentive structure of the experiment20. The evidence from the
quiz completed by each subject before the experiment does not show any support for this
option. We have assigned a score to each quiz taken, which is 1 if all the answers are correct, 0.5
if some answers are not perfect but it is clear that the subject overall understood the rules, and 0
if there are substantial and repeated mistakes. The four highest users score an average of 0.92
against a general average of the 32 subjects of 0.89. In other words, the heavy users seems – if
something - better skilled than average.
(d)  There is a remarkable consistency over time in the individual use patterns, which indicates that
the differences across agents are purposive rather than random. A rough measure of time
consistency comes from the comparison of the agent average use levels of the first and second
half of the experiment. The greater the similarity between the two values, the stronger the
consistency claim can be. In order to compare the correlation of the individual use levels over
time, we have run an ordinary least square regression on agent ranking. Each agent has been
assigned her ranking position in terms of average use within the experimental group. The first-
half-of-the-experiment ranking has been regressed on the second-half-of-the-experiment
ranking without a constant term. Rank correlation informs on the existence of any form of
monotonic relation between the values and it is a better choice than absolute value correlation,
which can capture only linear relations between the two variables. When using ranks, the
coefficient is in the interval [-1, +1]. A negative value denotes a decreasing relation and a
positive value denotes an increasing relation. The higher the absolute value, the stronger the
monotonic relation is. A zero value means that there is no monotonic relation at all. Our best
result will be a 1-value coefficient. When all the no sanction experiments are pooled together,
the estimated coefficient is 0.936 (number of observations is 32, R-squared 0.88. See Table 3 for
single experiment regressions). This test supports the view that over time agents are consistently
heterogeneous.
(e) From here to make precise statements on the nature of unobservable preferences there is a
jump.  We find some help in the use strategy notes that the participants left on their final
questionnaire, which often mention other agents’ earnings. Here is one: “ My greed went to the
extent of causing me not to want to fall behind having at least 1/8 of the market share because I
                                                     
20 If the heavy investors are confused subjects, however, it is unclear why we do not find them in the experiment with
the weak sanction treatment (see Figure 5). Such experimental design is more complex than the no sanction design,
although the threshold level for sanctioning gives a vague clue about the equilibrium level and the monetary incentive
against high appropriation levels are higher.
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didn’t want others making more profit per period.” One of the highest users explicitly
mentioned in the description of his strategy the goal of decreasing the earnings of the others: “
[I] tried to keep a large portion of the token used by forcing the others to adjust their use so that
the total would be profitable“.
(f) The estimation of the other-regarding agent model on the experimental data leads to consistent
results.  Since the difference between the classical and other-regarding model is just in the slope
of the best response function (cfr. (2) and (2’’); see also Figure 2), the regressions assume a
correct value for the intercept. The estimation is done under the assumption that the agents
expect the others to act in period t as they did in period t-1: 
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the 32 agent-specific estimated values of the slope fall into the allowed interval [-1,0]
corresponding to an other-regarding parameter γi ∈[-1,+1]. The γi estimates range from a
minimum of  -0.40 to a maximum of 0.08. About 37% of the agents have a parameter γi
significantly different from zero at a 0.05 level and our model classifies them as either altruistic
when γi is positive (2 agents) or spiteful when γi is negative (10 agents).
<    Figure 5 about here    >
To sum up, group efficiency is below the classical Nash equilibrium level (at 39.5% efficiency)
and precisely at 29.5% in our experiments. WGO reported an average negative efficiency (-3.2%)
but at a closer analysis the difference between the two studies occurs in the earlier rounds and dies
out over time: the convergence values estimated with the Ashenfelter-El Gamal model are
statistically indistinguishable (131.97 WGO and 133.78 ours), although our data reject the Nash
equilibrium value of X=128  at a 0.05 level where WGO data are more noisy21. Moreover, individual
actions are widely heterogeneous. WGO’s report that in the 48% of the rounds not a single agent
used 16 tokens. In our experiments the figure is 90%22
                                                     
21  Average group efficiency is computed using WGO’s 3 experiments and the first 20 rounds of the 4 no sanction
experiment in this paper. The 0.95 confidence interval of the Ashenfelter-El Gamal asymptotes are[124.38, 139.56] for
WGO and [ 129.33, 138.22] for ours.
22 Part of the increase observed in our experiments might be due to the re-scaling of the action space and to the
opportunity to invest any real and not only integer number.
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The predominance of spiteful agents over altruistic ones can account both for the overuse at
the group level and for the observed pattern of individual actions. A model relying on
homogeneous, self-interested agents cannot explain either one of the two regularities23.
8. RESULTS OF WEAK SANCTION EXPERIMENTS
This section describes the outcome of four experiments run under the weak sanction treatment
and in particular it focuses on the inspection decisions (Result 3) and their effects on the use
decisions (Result 2).
Result 2. With the introduction of weak sanctions,
(i) Group efficiency improves substantially. Resource use efficiency moves from
       below the classical Nash Equilibrium to above the classical Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Inequality in the individual use of the resource decreases relative to the no sanction
      design
These results are not predicted by the classical model (Proposition 2A) but they are
consistent with the heterogeneous, other regarding agent model (Proposition 2B).
Support:
(i)  The efficiency level is considerably higher with weak sanctions than without sanctions and is well
above the classical Nash equilibrium prediction (39.5%) for any specific index considered. The
gross efficiency level has roughly doubled (28.4% without sanctions, 57.19% with weak
sanctions). The change is minimal when we correct for the differences in length among
experiments and consider the first 25 periods only (28.9% versus 56.21%).
Requesting sanctions is a costly activity and so a fair comparison needs to consider the cost of
the inspection mechanism. In fact, inspection fees are a deadweight loss for the group and as
such needs to be subtracted from the rent extracted under the sanction treatments. The amount
                                                     
23 The experimental data might be explained by different specifications of other-regarding preference models. One
option is a reciprocity model (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2000).  Another alternative specification is the status seeker
model: Ui(πi, Π-i) = πi + δi (πi  / Π-i ), where δi>0 when agents care about relative income and δi =0 for pure self-
interested agents (see Ito, Saijo, and Une, 1995).  This latter model has been set aside for several reasons. The status
seeker model does not have any room for “altruistic” actions; it has a very unnatural behavior for group appropriation
levels above the open access level (X>144) because both πi  , Π-i <0. Regarding inspection decision, the status seeker
model predicts that agents never request inspections for (πi /Π-i )<1/θ, which implies that nobody inspects if they
expect a loss. Moreover, poor agents request fewer inspections than rich ones (there is however a need to define wealth
as current or cumulative earnings).
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of the fines is, instead, a plain transfer from an agent to another and is not a cost from the
group standpoint. When the inspection fees (8.9%) are subtracted, the net rent is 48.3%, which
is about twenty points above the no sanction level (cfr. Tables 3 and 5). When the agents are
experienced the efficiency improvement is even greater: the net rent of experienced subjects is
on average 62.02% versus a 34.56% of inexperienced ones (see Figure 3).
The total group use is substantially lower for sanction experiments than for no sanction ones.
As an overall average, group use drops from 131.3 to 115.5 tokens (statistically different at 0.01
level). The aggregate use is statistically different from both the classical Nash equilibrium and
the socially optimal level (0.01 level). The classical Nash equilibrium X=128 was recorded in the
1.85% of the rounds (2 out of 108). When considering the classical model, the overall group use
average is not statistically different from the one-probability inspection prediction (X=113.7)
but it is for one experimental session run with experienced subjects (0.05 level). The group use
across periods ranged from a minimum of 87 to a maximum of 186.8, which is wider than the
same range for no sanction experiments.
Similar results come from the estimation of the Ashenfelter-El Gamal model explained in
Section 7. The ordinary least squared asymptote of X=114.8 is not significantly different from
the one-probability inspection level (0.05 level) while it is from the zero-probability level (see
Table 3).
(ii) Agent inequality decreases compare to the no sanction treatment. The spread in average use
levels between the highest and the lowest users greatly decreased with the introduction of weak
sanctions and inequalities in use levels measured using Gini coefficients fell dramatically (Table
3). As a direct consequence, income inequalities from use decreased24.
The comparison of the results in the no-sanction and sanction environments is carried on under the
assumption that agents were drawn from a population with identical preference patterns. Even if the
agents were not the same in the different experiments, we think that the conclusions drawn under
the above assumption are reasonable.
Result 3.  With the introduction of weak sanctions, about half of the actions are inspected.
                                                     
24 Income from appropriation is defined as the gross revenues from appropriation minus the cost of tokens and it
excludes the period endowment as well as costs and revenues from the inspection activity. There is a very strong linear
correlation between average appropriation levels and average income from appropriation (0.97 for all experiments, 0.99
for no sanction experiments) and this fact explains the tight link between the Gini coefficients for the two variables. The
standard deviation of average appropriation and income levels exhibit similar patterns.
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(i) The number of inspections exceeds the number that is profitable.  In fact twice the
number of inspections take place than is ex-post profitable.
(ii) The highest users are more aggressive inspectors than the lowest users
These results are not predicted by the classical model (Proposition 3A) but they are
consistent with the heterogeneous, other regarding agent model (Proposition 3B). Some
inspection decisions can be classified as mistakes.
Support:
(i)   The prediction of the classical model of no inspections is clearly incorrect, since 51.5% of the
actions were inspected (Table 4) when only 18.4% were profitable to inspect. Some of the
inspections turn out in a positive income for the inspector while others in a loss (when xi<16).
The inspections with a negative balance were either mistakes due to the asymmetric information
or purposive decisions of other-regarding agents. We will investigate both possibilities.
 <    Table 4 about here    >
For a given group use level, the agents know the number of over-users if they know the
empirical density function of the agent types. In the first period, however, they don’t know the
identity of such agents.
The number of actual inspections compared to the number of potentially profitable ones is very
high (about twice as many). This ratio does not decline as the agents get more familiar with the
inspection device (1.86 inexperience versus 2.22 experienced subjects) and as the agents reveal
their type during the experiment (2.02 first half of the experiment, 2.13 second half, 1.82 after
announcement)25.
                                                   <    Table 5 about here    >
We know that spiteful agents will purposely request some un-profitable inspections. If fact,
when an inspection was requested, it was unprofitable about 62% of the times  (Table 4). While
                                                     
25 About 35.1% of the inspecting decisions generated a lower income for the inspector that they could have, either
because a potentially profitable inspection has not been requested (type I error) or because a potentially non-profitable
inspection has been requested (type II error). Such “error rate” is substantially lower for experienced agents (29.2%
versus 41.0%). In spite of the excessive inspecting activity, the inspection balance is close to the zero level ([-1.5%, +1%]
in terms of the maximum rent). Type II errors are higher than type I errors (42.6% versus 17.0%). See Table 5.
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the heterogeneous, other-regarding agent model is compatible with such behavior as long as the
reward parameter is ϑ<1, there are decisions that only extremely spiteful agents would
willingfully request. Since section 6 defined as acceptable range for other-regarding attitudes the
interval γi ∈[-1, +1], decision to inspect other agents where ϑ>1 are classified as mistakes.26.
According to such definition, in the weak sanction environment 18.7% of the inspecting actions
are considered mistakes. In other words, the high number of unprofitable inspections is due to
agent mistakes as much as it is due to spiteful preferences.
(ii)  As predicted by the heterogeneous, other-regarding agent model (proposition 3B), spiteful
agents are more aggressive inspectors than altruistic agents.
Agents were divided into three groups according to their average use level in the experiment.
The inspecting behaviors of high versus low users was compared keeping out of the analyses
the group of median users among whom there were no significant differences in individual use
at a 0.05 level. Relatively spiteful agents requested on average more inspections per period than
relatively altruistic agents did, when controlling for the resource use by all the other agents in
the group. This conclusion is based on the sign and significance of the coefficient of the
dummy variable for highest users in Table 6 (positive for weak sanctions, negative for strong
sanctions)27.
<    Table 6 about here    >
Although preferences do not account  for all the inspection “errors”, they play a relevant role.
More investigations are needed on the beliefs about other agents’ use levels (see for instance
Coats and Neilson, 1999).
9. RESULTS OF STRONG SANCTION EXPERIMENTS
                                                     
26 In our sanction design the reward parameter ϑ increases with the individual appropriation level of the targeted agent
in the interval xj∈(λ, x), where x=λ + (k/h). In particular, ϑ=[ hj (xj -λ)]/[ k - hj (xj -λ)] if λ< xj < x . Some numerical
values: for weak sanctions, ϑ=1 when xj=12.5, ϑ=2 when xj=13.66 and ϑ=4 when xj=14.75; for strong sanctions, ϑ=1
when xj=7.87, ϑ=2 when xj=8.16 and ϑ=4 when xj=8.4. In the interval [0, λ) no sanction is allowed and in (x, xˆ ]
inspecting is actually profitable and not costly, so ϑ is ill-defined.
27 Regressions for each single experiment confirm this general conclusion with the exception of one of the weak sanction
experiment (0225) where the highest investors dummy is not significant at 0.10 level.
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Result 4.  Strong sanctions have the effect of increasing resource use efficiency as predicted
by both the classical and the heterogeneous, other-regarding agent models.
Efficiency levels fall short of the Nash equilibrium of both models. Experienced subjects
tend to be closer to the equilibrium.
Support: In the two strong sanction experiments, the total group use was on average 85.1. This level
was significantly (0.01 level) higher than the outcome predicted by both the standard model
(71.1) and the heterogeneous, other-regarding agent model ([64, 72]). The conclusion does not
change when the Ashenfelter-El Gamal model is estimated. The ordinary least squared
asymptote is 86.13 (Table 3) and none of the predicted values are in its 95% confidence interval.
The group use across periods ranged from a minimum of 69 to a maximum of 126.
The efficiency level is very high, 93.98%, but still sub-optimal and lower than the target level.
When the inspection fees (17.12%) are subtracted, the net rent is 76.87% (Tables 3 and 5). Sub-
optimality might be due to the inexperience of subjects, since there is a significant improvement
in the group efficiency when subjects are experienced (gross rent 98.24% versus 89.73%)28.
Result 5.  In the strong sanction environment the heterogeneous, other-regarding agent
model performs better in predicting inspections than the classical model. In particular,
(i) The number of inspections exceeds the number that is profitable.  In fact about 50%
more inspections take place than is ex-post profitable.
(ii) The lowest users are more aggressive inspectors than the highest users
These results are not predicted by the classical model (Proposition 5A) but they are
consistent with the heterogeneous, other regarding agent model (Proposition 5B). Some
inspection decisions can be classified as mistakes.
Support:
(i)   About 99.1% of the actions were inspected, a value definitely close to the 100% predicted29. The
ratio between the undergone inspections over potentially non-negative balance inspections is
                                                     
28 The inequality in the average use across agents is substantially  lower than in the no sanction environment (Table 3).
The average standard deviation of the agent period earnings from appropriation is of 5.6 francs and 1.6 francs ones fines
are subtracted.
29  Although almost all the agents were inspected every period, not all the agents requested to inspect everybody every
period, as predicted by the classical model. On average an agent requested less than 4 inspections per period instead of 7.
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1.49, which is high but less severe than in the weak sanction experiments30. All potentially
profitable inspections were requested. Unprofitable inspections that were requested and turned
out to have a reward parameter ϑ>1 – decisions classified as mistakes - amounted to 25% of all
the inspecting actions. About three quarters of the unprofitable inspection decisions are
attributed to mistakes rather than to spiteful behavior (Table 4).
(ii)  Relatively spiteful agents (lower users) are more aggressive inspectors than relatively altruistic
agents (higher users) since the coefficient of the highest user variable is negative correlated and
significantly so with the number of inspections (Table 6).
The functioning of the inspection mechanism under the strong sanction treatment reveals
similar features than under the weak sanction treatment. There are too many inspections and the
relatively spiteful agents (lower users) are more active inspectors than relatively altruistic agents
(higher users) are.
10. CONCLUSIONS
The study supports four major conclusions.  First, the sanctioning institution, the Carte di
Regola, had a dramatic effect on pressuring the common pool resource to efficient use levels, given
that such levels are known and need only be enforced.  Secondly, a modification of the classical
model to include heterogeneous, other-regarding preferences seems to account for much of what is
observed.  Third, the major results of the Walker, Gardner and Ostrom, 1990 (WGO) paper are
replicated.  Thus, the patterns of data that were interpreted as the spite/altruistic paradox - which
motivated a close examination of their work - are also found in our data.  The fourth conclusion is
that the same model of heterogeneous preferences that accounts for our data also accounts for their
data in addition to the data from some other, closely related studies.
The heterogeneous, other regarding agent model provides room for altruistic, self-interested,
and spiteful agents who care to different degrees about other people’s earnings. For example,
spiteful agents, who find enjoyment in decreasing the earnings of others, play an important role.
                                                     
30 The surprise is the inspection balance that is largely positive. In equilibrium with (X*,p*) = (71.1, 1), we expect an
inspection balance about 1.4% of the maximum rent. Data talk of an average balance of 18.8%, more than ten times
higher than what was predicted. The reason of such “success” was not mainly in the exceptional ability in discovering
high investors but in the high average value of total group appropriation. In fact, about 32.6% of the inspecting
decisions were incorrect, which is only slightly lower than in weak sanction. The type II error is very high (0.972) and
there are no type I errors.
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While the model seems to resolve the spite/altruistic paradox, it does much more in providing
insights about why the sanctioning institutions represented by the Carte di Regola are so powerful and
might have lasted so many centuries in rural villages. The institution channels two possibly harmful
human tendencies, irrationality (a tendency to make mistakes) and spitefulness, into the creation of a
useful social incentive system.
     A summary of results that lead to these conclusions is easiest to explain with a focus, first, on the
two major results of Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom, 1990 (WGO). Both are related to common-pool
resource use in a sanction-free environment and both were replicated. First, they find that individual
actions are heterogeneous. At the individual level, the one-shot Nash equilibrium prediction of
identical actions across agents is definitely rejected in favor of a model of heterogeneous agents.
They produced the result and we replicated it (Result 1B).  Secondly, the tragedy of the commons is
more severe than would be expected from an examination of levels of cooperation in public goods
environments.  The levels are even higher (efficiency lower) than self interested free riders would
choose.  WGO produced the result and we replicated it.  However, we go further and demonstrate
that the result is explained when other regardingness is added to the model (Result 1 A).  In this
sense, the “spite/altruistic paradox” is clearly evident in our data as well as in theirs and the paradox
is resolved by the model.
Having reflected on the heterogeneous, other regarding agents model, its consistency with
additional data found in the literature is apparent. Given its flexibility beyond that of the classical
Nash model, the heterogeneous, other regarding model provides insights about three rather
perplexing aspects of behavior uncovered by other experiments, beyond the spiteful/altruist
paradox.
First it is not clear why the sanctioning system used in the WGO study should work.  Within
the classical model there is no incentive for anyone to administer sanctions in the context of the
institutions studied by WGO. Individuals, who choose to punish others when there is a cost to
administering punishment and no reward, are not behaving according to the classical Nash
equilibrium model. In the generalization of the classical model the motivation is easy to find and the
perplexing behavior can be understood. It is because spite plays a role.  The spiteful agent gets utility
from imposing sanctions on others.
       Secondly, the WGO experiments contain another aspect of behavior that is not so easy to
explain for both the classical model and the heterogeneous, other regarding agent model. The issue
is the choice of whom a spiteful person will inspect or punish.  Within the Carte di Regola institution
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the prediction of who to inspect is clear because the agent who successfully identifies a violator is
rewarded with the amount of the sanction and the sanction level varies with the use level. Thus, one
always inspects suspected violators.  However, within the sanction institutions studied by WGO that
is not the case.  Without a differential reward – as it is the case of WGO - the spiteful person of the
model does not care who is punished so long as someone is. But, subjects in the WGO experiments
target their punishments to the particular individuals who are large users of the resource.  In order to
explain such phenomena the heterogeneous, other regarding model must be amended.  Two
candidates for change represent themselves.  One is the introduction of attitudes of reciprocity (Fehr
and Gatcher, 1999; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2000).  The second is to include the possibility of
repeated play.  Which of these explanations might be more reliable cannot be answered in the
context of our experimental design. Thus, for now, the heterogeneous, other regarding model
remains incomplete.
The third perplexing phenomena found in the WGO study is found as a result of their
change of the maximum level of individual resource use allowed.  Basically, in one treatment the
individual “strategy space” was expanded without any other change in the rest of the experimental
design. Suppose the admissible levels of use are increased in a manner that preserves the initial Nash
equilibrium. In essence, this increase in the upper bound simply supplies agents with options that are
irrelevant to their actions from the point of view of classical model. The surprising effect, observed
and reported by WGO, is that such a change in the design is accompanied by an increase in the
levels of use.  That is, options that should have no impact at all have a systematic impact.
A generalization of the classical model to include the possibility of heterogeneous, other
regarding individuals, provides a potential explanation for this third, perplexing aspect.  Proposition
1B demonstrates that the addition of spiteful agents is in fact accompanied by an increase in use
levels.   While individual data are not available from the WGO study, such data that are available
suggest that some individual choices of use in the WGO experiments were at the maximum
possible31. A natural interpretation is that they had spiteful agents in their experiments that were
exploiting the resource to the maximum of their ability.  An increase in the amount they could use
would remove a constraint on their behavior and result in still greater levels of use.
 The primary purpose of the research reported here is to study the effectiveness of an ancient
method of managing renewable resources. The first conclusion is related to the impact of the special
                                                     
31 In the experiments with a “restricted strategy space”, the modal strategic response of individuals was to use the
resource to the maximum of their ability (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1993, p.121).
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monitoring and sanctioning institution. The rules of the institution were fashioned after the
historical case of use of a common pool resource in the Italian Alps called Carte di Regola, where
people could inspect one another and inflict punishments according to some rules that could be
enforced in a court of law.  While the differences between this institution and others might seem
subtle, the impact is pronounced.
The overriding result is that the Carte di Regola greatly improves the efficiency of the resource
use.  It is important to note that the improvement is not only in terms of gross efficiency but also
net efficiency, where the costs of administering the system (the inspection fees) are deducted.  Under
the weak sanction treatment there is a spectacular improvement in gross efficiency (from 28.4% to
57.2%) that is not predicted by the classical model. Once the inspecting costs are considered, (net)
efficiency remains very high (48.3%). Group behavior in the strong sanction environment shows
large improvements (from 28.4% to 94% gross, or 76.9% net) but is not at the optimal level, as was
instead predicted by both classical and heterogeneous, other-regarding agent models (Results 2 and
4).
     The second overriding result is related to the relative accuracy of the model we apply.  The
prediction of the heterogeneous, other-regarding agent model is that spiteful agents are more
aggressive inspectors than altruistic agents under all conditions (weak and strong sanctions). In fact,
the spiteful agents are even willing to request unprofitable inspections. On the other hand the level
of use of the resource by the spiteful agents relative to altruistic agents reverses from relative heavy
user to least user as the treatment is changed from weak to strong sanctions.  This seemingly
perverse relationship, the flip in the relative behavior, is exactly reflected in the data from the
experiments (Results 3 and 5).   On the other hand, the high rate of unprofitable inspections is
understandable in part as spiteful behavior and in part as mistakes originating from wrong beliefs
about the individual use levels of the other agents (Result 3 and 5).
In the explanation of the results under all experimental treatments a key role is played by the
heterogeneity of behavior of the agents, and in particular by the presence of few spiteful agents.
Thus, the major theoretical advance resulting from the experiments is that two major elements of
the model, other regarding preferences and heterogeneity of agents, are important keys to the
understanding of behavior concerning common pool resources and institutions designed and
implemented to protect them.  The self-administered monitoring and sanctioning system studied in
this paper performed very well in helping solve the “tragedy of the commons”. In our view, its main
strength is the ability of such institution to turn individual mistakes and socially harmful attitudes
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into beneficial actions for the group through the possibility of inspections that modify agent
incentives. In fact, individuals who mistakenly inspect others are providing a public good by bearing
the monitoring cost of the system. The Carte di Regola system has channeled spite into better group
performances. This feature might have been one reason for its endurance. Maintaining an inspection
mechanism involves a deadweight loss for the group but a careful choice of the parameters could
bring benefits that compensate many times for that loss.
By focusing on the Carte di Regola one can identify a broad fabric of institutions, together
with how other studies fit in that fabric, and speculate about the role of subtle institutional
differences in shaping overall social behavior.  Table 1 produces a list of institutional features each
of which can be interpreted as a module to be added or removed in the creation of special
sanctioning systems.  How these modules may interact or whether interesting systems can be
developed from them remains to be explored.  Clearly the Carte di Regola does not solve all of the
public goods problems and in particular does not address the most obvious problem of determining
how much of the public good should exist (or similarly, how much the resource should be used).
However, the system does provide parameters that can be adjusted to control uses of environmental
resources.  Because the parameters are rule based, the Carte di Regola can be differentiated from social
sanction systems, such as a system of vigilantes, in which the level of sanction and even whether or
not a sanction should be imposed is the decision of self appointed inspectors within the system.
This capacity for parameter adjustment through rule changes, and the sequential trail and error
decisions it facilitates, might provide a step in solving the difficult problem of determining optimum
levels.
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APPENDIX A:  PARAMETERS OF THE NO SANCTION DESIGN
Our  design:
Number of people in the group: 8 Conversion rate $ 0.04 per 1 franc
Total group earnings (in francs): πi = 2.5⋅(E - xi) + 
x
X
i  ⋅f(X)
where xi∈[0, xˆ ]  for  i=1, .. ,8; xˆ =50; the cost of tokens is 2.5⋅(E - xi); endowment E=4 or E=0, and
Gross group return ( )
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Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom (1990) high endowment design (WGO):
Number of people in the group: 8 Conversion rate $ 0.01 per 1 franc
Total group earnings (in francs): πi = 5⋅(25 - xi) + 
x
X
i  ⋅f(X)
where   xi∈[0, 25]  for  i=1, .. ,8; market 1 earnings are 5⋅ (E - xi ); the endowment is E=25, and
Market 2 earnings f(X)= 23⋅X  - 
1
4
 X2
---------------
There are differences between our no sanction design and WGO both in the incentive structure (1-
4) and in the way the information is conveyed (A-D) (earnings are expressed in dollars per person
per period):
1. The range of the choice variable xi has been rescaled from [0,25] to [0,50] because the
difference between two possible equilibrium points, Nash equilibrium and open access, was just
one unit. Increasing the perceived number of steps from 25 to 50 might lead to a more accurate
use decision. Moreover, in pilot experiments we noticed that people generally input integer
numbers even if the software allowed any real number. This fact may be a problem since in
WGO the socially optimal use level corresponds to a non-integer individual use (4.5 tokens).
2. The conversion rate franc/dollar has been increased four times from $ 0.01 to $ 0.04 per 1
franc in order to maintain a higher effort level by the participants in the experiment. As a result,
the difference in terms of individual earnings between the social optimum and open access points
has increased from $ 0.405 to $ 1.62. The adjustment has been suggested by the playful behavior
of some subjects during the pilot experiment when the low conversion rate was used.
3. The minimum safe earning level has been decreased. If nothing is used in the “risky”
market 2, the original earnings were $1.25. In our setting a zero use (xi=0) yields a period return
of $0.4 (when E=4). The change implies a downward shift in the payoff but does not affect the
incentive structure. The reason of the change is to limit the maximum earnings that would have
otherwise been too high given the new conversion rate (point 2).
4. The Gross group return has been modified in the interval [184, 400]. The function f(X) now
has a lower bound at –200 francs that is much higher than it originally was.  A group use of
X=184 has an efficiency of –142% in both settings. At X=400 the difference in dollar earnings
is small ($ –5.6 instead of $ –6.75). The reason for the change is to limit the maximum loss given
the new conversion rate in case people “go crazy” (see point 2). In the experiments conducted,
we observed an use level above 184 just in one round out of 291.
<    Table 1A about here    >
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A. Graph instead of formula. WGO provided the subjects with the analytical expression of the
gross group return from market 2. The expression may have been used to compute the
equilibrium. We replaced it with a plot of the function f(X) because we think that the graph
would easy the understanding of the basic underlying phenomenon. The graph in the
instructions is similar to the upper part of Figure 1 once the cost line is removed.
B. Detailed table. In order to compute the equilibrium, subjects could use a very detailed table of
gross group return. The table gives the gross group return and the return per token used for 100
values of the total group use, compared to the 10 values given by WGO. All theoretical
equilibrium points are listed in the table given to the subjects. Our table does not supply the
marginal returns, which instead WGO provided.
C. Different software. The software was run on Netscape and was written specifically for this
application. It includes a calculator to compute the cost of tokens, the gross group return, and
the individual share of gross for every possible real level of use in the admissible range.
D. In WGO market 1 represents the opportunity cost of the use and yields a constant return. The
way in which it was presented to the subjects in this study is as a direct cost of the use. You can
order the tokens to use and pay a constant unit price for them. This change may make the
decision of the agents easier by suggesting a comparison of the price of tokens with the return
from the market.
<    Table 3A about here    >
APPENDIX B:  INSTRUCTIONS
Important note: The instructions reported below are for weak sanction experiments with E=4
(0225, 0824, 0408). The instructions for sanction-free experiments with E=4 (0216, 0908, 0407) did
not include the parts in square brackets.
This is an experiment in decision making. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions you
may earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash in private at the end of the experiment.
You will make most of your money by [ either (1) ] placing an order for tokens and INVESTING them in a
market that will give you a cash return for your tokens [ (See example #1 below), or (2) MONITORING other people’s
decisions and eventually getting some revenues from the inspections (See example #2 below)  ].
The experiment in which you are participating is comprised of a sequence of periods. In each period you will be
asked to make an investment [ and a monitoring ] decision.
INVESTING
Each period you can place an order for a number of tokens between 0 and 50 which will be automatically
invested in the market. There are also seven other persons in this experiment who are making investment decisions on
the same market. Everybody can place orders up to 50 tokens and so the  total group investment is at most 400 ( = 50
times 8 people).
For every token you order,  you will be charged  2.5  francs and you will be credited a cash return from the
market.
The return from the market is a bit complicated to explain.  The return depends on the number of tokens you
invest as well as the amount all others in the group invest. The total group investment determines the gross group return
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(See table on the board) and you will receive a fraction of it according to your personal investment level. The example
below explains the computation in detail.
You make your decision before knowing other people’s investment decisions on that period. You are not to reveal
your investment decision to anyone.
EXAMPLE [ #1 ]
Suppose you place an order of 6 tokens to be invested in the market  and everybody else does exactly the same.
The cost of your tokens is 15 francs, that is 6 tokens times 2.5 francs.
To compute your earnings in the market,
(1) first, compute  the total group investment. In this example, the total group investment is 48 tokens (6 tokens times 8
people). The corresponding gross group return is 408 francs, as shown in the table on the board. The first column
of the table lists the total group investment and the third column gives you the corresponding gross group return.
(2) The second step is to compute your share of gross. You will receive a fraction of the gross group return that is
equal to your  fraction of total group investment. You have invested   
6
48
0125= .  of total group investment
and you will receive 0.125 of the gross group return: 51 francs is your share of gross  (408*0.125).
Your net return is 36 francs (your share of gross, 51, minus the cost of the tokens, 15).
As a computational shortcut for your share of gross, you can multiply your personal investment level by the
“Return per token invested” column of the table on the board,
that is 6 * 8.5 = 51. !
The gross group return is graphed below.
Notice that the gross group return on the market can be negative if the total group investment is sufficiently large.
For instance, if each person invests 42 tokens, the total group investment is 336 tokens and the gross group return is
−200 francs. When considering the cost of the tokens, each person has to pay 130 francs.
To sum up, your period earnings [ from investment ] in francs are given by:
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     + Your share of gross 51 +  
     −  Cost of tokens 15 −  
= Your net return 36
     + Period endowment  10+            Fix amount
= Period earnings 46
The period endowment is a constant amount and does not depend on the investment decisions.
In the example the period earnings in dollars are  ______ ( 1 franc = ____ cents).
If you have any questions concerning the instructions feel free to raise your hand and an instructor will assist you.
[ MONITORING
After the total group investment is revealed, you will have the chance to impose a payment to the people that
invested more than 9 tokens in the market. This payment will be given to you. Notice that if the total group
investment is more than 72 tokens (that is 9 tokens times 8 people), at least one person invested more then 9 tokens.
You don’t know the individual investments of the other people, but you can ask to uncover them by paying 7
francs for every person you ask to inspect (inspection fee). If the person inspected invested more than 9 tokens, she
pays 1 franc for every extra token. You get this money (inspection revenue) and everybody will know the
investment level of the person inspected.
You make the monitoring decision when you know the total group investment, but before knowing other people’s
monitoring decisions.
An identification number will be assigned to every person to maintain anonymity and it must be considered
strictly confidential.
EXAMPLE #2
Suppose the total group investment is 172 tokens and your investment is 24 tokens (you are ID #1). Before the
monitoring, you know that 100 extra tokens were invested (=172 - 72) but you don’t know who invested them. Well,
you did part of the job with 15 tokens (=24 - 9), but there are other seven people around that invested  85 extra tokens.
Suppose you ask to inspect person #2 and she has invested 34 tokens. You pay an inspection fee of 7 francs and get an
inspection revenue of 25 francs (= (34 - 9) * 1). After your inspection, everybody will know that person #2 has invested
34 tokens, but your identity will not be revealed.
Besides the period earnings from investment already explained above, your earnings will be affected by your and
other people’s monitoring decisions as follows:
                                                       ID#1      ID#2
Inspection Fee  -   7
Inspection Revenue + 25
Payment   ___  - 25
= Balance +18  - 25
!
If two or more people ask to inspect the same person, only one inspection will be executed. A person will be
randomly selected and she will pay the inspection fee and get the eventual inspection revenue. The other inspectors will
be treated as if they did not ask to inspect that person.
If you have any questions concerning the instructions feel free to raise your hand and somebody will assist you.  ]
Please, go through the review session in the next page and fill in the blank lines with the values you think are correct.
See example #2
See example [#1 ]
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PRACTICE    ID   ______
REVIEW
Consider the following investment decisions:
ID# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  Total group
investment
tokens 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 27 104
Suppose you are person #1. To compute your net return on the market let use the computational shortcut mentioned in
the example [ #1 ]. Take your investment of 11 tokens and multiply it by 5.00 (Return per token invested, second
column of the table on the board) = 55 francs is your share of gross.  Your net return is 27.5 francs (your share of gross
= 55 minus the cost of tokens = 27.5).
Now, you go on.
Gross group return _____________
Person #2: Share of gross  ________________ Net return __________________
Person #8: Share of gross  ________________ Net return __________________
[ Suppose you inspect person #2 and #8. Your inspection revenues will be:
Inspection Revenue from person #2 ___________ Balance (Insp. Revenue - Insp.Fee) ______
Inspection Revenue from person #8 ___________ Balance (Insp. Revenue - Insp.Fee) ______ ]
Now, suppose you decide to increase your personal investment to 43 tokens, while everybody else stays the same, hence
the total group investment raises to 136 tokens.
Gross group return _____________
Person #1: Share of gross  ________________ Net return __________________
Person #2: Share of gross  ________________ Net return __________________
Person #8: Share of gross  ________________ Net return __________________
[ Suppose this time somebody asks to inspect you (you will pay for every token above 9):
Person #1: Payment _______________  ]
!
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions and an instructor will assist you.
[ Otherwise, please go on to the next page. ]
PRELIMINARIES
1. At the beginning we will run a two-period experiment to get familiar with the rules. It will NOT affect your
earnings.
2. During the real session, an announcement will be made two periods before the end of the experiment.
The total number of periods is unknown to you.
3. Please, sign and date the following financial agreement.
Should my total earnings from the experiment be negative, I agree to work in the Experimental Economics and Political Science
Laboratory at a rate of 7 dollars per hour until the loss is repaid.
Name and Signature __________________________________________
Date   _____________
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(Please detach this sheet and give it to the experimenter)
-------------------------------------------------------
Total             Return        Gross
 group          per token Group
investment  invested Return
-------------------------------------------------------
  0 0.00 0.0
  4 11.25 45.0
  8 11.00 88.0
12 10.75 129.0
16 10.50 168.0
20 10.25 205.0
24 10.00 240.0
28 9.75 273.0
32 9.50 304.0
36 9.25 333.0
40 9.00 360.0
44 8.75 385.0
48 8.50 408.0
52 8.25 429.0
56 8.00 448.0
60 7.75 465.0
64 7.50 480.0
68 7.25 493.0
72 7.00 504.0
76 6.75 513.0
80 6.50 520.0
84 6.25 525.0
88 6.00 528.0
92 5.75 529.0
96 5.50 528.0
100 5.25 525.0
104 5.00 520.0
108 4.75 513.0
112 4.50 504.0
116 4.25 493.0
120 4.00 480.0
124 3.75 465.0
128 3.50 448.0
132 3.25 429.0
136 3.00 408.0
140 2.75 385.0
144 2.50 360.0
148 2.25 333.0
152 2.00 304.0
156 1.75 273.0
160 1.50 240.0
164 1.25 205.0
168 1.00 168.0
172 0.75 129.0
176 0.50 88.0
180 0.25 45.0
184 0.00 0.0
188 -0.22 -41.1
192 -0.38 -73.7
196 -0.51 -99.7
-------------------------------------------------------
Total             Return        Gross
 group          per token Group
investment  invested Return
-------------------------------------------------------
200 -0.60 -120.3
204 -0.67 -136.7
208 -0.72 -149.7
212 -0.75 -160.0
216 -0.78 -168.2
220 -0.79 -174.8
224 -0.80 -179.9
228 -0.81 -184.1
232 -0.81 -187.3
236 -0.80 -189.9
240 -0.80 -192.0
244 -0.79 -193.7
248 -0.79 -195.0
252 -0.78 -196.0
256 -0.77 -196.8
260 -0.76 -197.5
264 -0.75 -198.0
268 -0.74 -198.4
272 -0.73 -198.7
276 -0.72 -199.0
280 -0.71 -199.2
284 -0.70 -199.4
288 -0.69 -199.5
292 -0.68 -199.6
296 -0.67 -199.7
300 -0.67 -199.7
304 -0.66 -199.8
308 -0.65 -199.8
312 -0.64 -199.9
316 -0.63 -199.9
320 -0.62 -199.9
324 -0.62 -199.9
328 -0.61 -199.9
332 -0.60 -200.0
336 -0.60 -200.0
340 -0.59 -200.0
344 -0.58 -200.0
348 -0.57 -200.0
352 -0.57 -200.0
356 -0.56 -200.0
360 -0.56 -200.0
364 -0.55 -200.0
368 -0.54 -200.0
372 -0.54 -200.0
376 -0.53 -200.0
380 -0.53 -200.0
384 -0.52 -200.0
3. Multiply the
average return by
the number of
tokens you have
invested
1. Find out
the actual
group
investment
2. Look at the
average return
of each token
GROSS GROUP RETURN on the market
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388 -0.52 -200.0
392 -0.51 -200.0
396 -0.51 -200.0
400 -0.50 -200.0
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FIGURES and TABLES:
Figure 1: TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMMON-POOL RESOURCE
OPTIMAL USE    NASH EQUILIBRIUM   OPEN  ACCESS
72         128 144 Group use X
  9           16    18 Symmetric individual use
          100%           39.5%      0% Efficiency level (% of maximum rent)
______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: The group welfare is Π = f(X) - v⋅X, (the endowment E is set to zero);
efficiency increases in [0,72) and decreases in (72,400]
Figure 2:  BEST RESPONSE FUNCTIONS, no-sanction treatment
                  
Range        
   of            
choice        
                  
Notes: In the no-sanction design (N=8, a=23/2, v=2.5, b=1/16)
the classical best response function (selfish agent) is xi*= 72 - ½ x-I (solid bold line)
 92
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Figure 3: AVERAGE EFFICIENCY BY EXPERIMENT
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Figure 4: AVERAGE GROUP USE BY EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT
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Table 1:  MONITORING AND SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS
CASARI and
PLOTT (2000)
[This study]
MOIR (1998) OSTROM et al
(1994)
FEHR and
GATCHER
(1999)
Environment: Common-pool
Resource
Common-pool
Resource
Common-pool
Resource
Public Goods
Provision
MONITORING (SEARCH)
• Monitoring Fee Fixed fee for
each request
Variable fee for
each request
None None
• Are all individual
use levels (investment
levels) revealed?
No, only if
somebody in the
group requests it
No, only if the
agent requests it
All use levels are
public; all agent
histories are
public
All use levels are
public; no
individual history
is available
SANCTIONING
Targeted agent:
• Amount of the fine In a fixed
proportion of
over-use
Subjective choice
of inspector
(variable upper
bound)
Subjective choice
of inspector
(fixed upper bound)
Subjective choice
of inspector (up to
100% of period
earnings)
• Condition for
inflicting the fine
If over-use
occurred
If over-use
occurred
Subjective Subjective
• Multiple fines on
the same action
No Yes Yes Yes
• Identity of targeted
agent
Publicly known
after fine
Publicly know
after fine
Unclear* Known only to
targeted and
inspecting agent
Inspecting agent:
• Fee (cost of
administering the
fine)
Included in
monitoring fee
Proportional to
the amount of the
sanction
Proportional to
the amount of the
sanction
More than
proportional to
the amount of the
sanction
• Who receives the
fine
Inspector Experimenter Experimenter Experimenter
• Limits to requests
of sanctions per
period
None Limited to the
budget of the
inspector
Each agent is
limited to a single
request
Unclear*
• Identity of
requesting agent
Not revealed Not revealed Not revealed Not revealed*
Notes: (*) This feature was not explicitely described in the papers. Monitoring is always perfect (i.e. there is truthful
revelation of the action). In Ostrom(1992) and Fehr and Gatcher (1999) agents can sanction each other but there is
really no monitoring device, since the individual actions are automatically revealed to everybody at the end of each
period.  Moir(1998) introduces two distinct decisions, first to monitor an agent and then to eventually sanction her. We
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have compacted them in a single decision: to inspect an agent or not. An inspection uncovers another agent’s action and
automatically inflicts a sanction if some conditions are met.
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Table 2: EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS
E x p e r i m e n t s
NO
SANCTION
WEAK
SANCTION
STRONG
SANCTION
Date 0216 0908 0407 0909 0225 0824 0408 0825 0831 0901
Sanctions No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes*
Experience No No Yes Yes+ No No Yes Yes+ No Yes+
Number of rounds 32^ 32 33 32 27 27 27 27 27 27
Period endowment (tokens) 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 0 0
Conversion rate ($ per franc) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Notes:
Date Experiments were done at the California Institute of Technology in 1998
Sanctions “No” is a no sanction experiment;
“Yes” means that a monitoring and sanctioning device was added to the no sanction  experiment;
“Yes*” indicates a different set of sanctioning parameters (see Section 5.3 for details)
Experience “No” means that no subject has ever participated in this type of experiment before;
“Yes” means that all the subjects have already participated in this type of experiment
 (on Dec 9, 1997 at the earliest);
“Yes+” means that all the subjects have participated the day before in this type of
experiment with the same group of people
No. of rounds Number of effective rounds of interaction, which excludes two practice rounds;
(^) On 0216 a paper copy of the “Return from investment” table was handed to the
subjects between the 10th and the 11th round instead of before the 1st round. During the whole
experiment the table was projected on the wall of the room.
Period endowment The endowment E indicates the number of tokens given each period to each subject and is adjusted
for the sole purpose of rescaling the minimum earnings of the subject (default earnings when she
chooses not to use the common-pool resource). The endowment level E could be modified
independently from the upper limit in the individual use of the common-pool resource xˆ  that was
always kept at the same level, xˆ =50 (more in Section 2).
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Table 3: SUMMARY TABLE FOR USE DECISIONS
E x p e r i m e n t s
NO
SANCTION
WEAK
SANCTION
STRONG
SANCTION
Date 0216 0908 0407 0909 0225 0824 0408 0825 0831 0901
Sanctions No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes*
Experience No No Yes Yes+ No No Yes Yes+ No Yes+
Number of rounds 32^ 32 33 32 27 27 27 27 27 27
Period endowment (tokens) 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 0 0
Conversion rate ($ per franc) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
GROUP USE
Average 124.71 134.17 133.08 133.31 125.60 115.44 110.81 110.04 91.07 79.07
Classical Nash equilibrium 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 71.11 71.11
Minimum 100 85.5 121.5 87 87.3 87 92.5 90 74 69
Maximum 154 161 149.5 167 186.8 160 154.7 137 126 95.5
Standard deviation (Sd) 14.84 15.49 6.01 15.46 23.13 20.57 12.15 10.20 13.22 6.50
First half Sd/Second half Sd 4.52 1.68 2.59 0.79 0.92 0.83 2.57 1.46 2.18 0.85
EVOLUTION OF GROUP USE OVER TIME (Ashenfelter-El Gamal model)
-     Starting point 105.69 97.72 122.37 131.90 147.86 106.02 118.44 105.88 93.79 63.85
- Asymptote
[0.95 confidence interval]
133.96
[130.96, 136.57]
114.78
[110.51, 119.06]
86.13
[82.23,90.02]
GROUP EFFICIENCY                         (% of   maximum rent)
Average Rent 42.29 20.97 27.36 23.00 34.67 55.74 68.20 70.15 89.73 98.24
First 25 periods 42.48 23.74 27.13 22.27 32.43 52.71 68.94 70.75 89.29 98.14
Last 2 periods (after announce.) 54.23 1.28 28.21 41.06 62.68 93.58 58.95 62.62 95.29 99.47
INDIVIDUAL AVERAGE USE LEVELS
Lowest average user 8.8 10.6 9.9 9.0 11.7 10.2 11.0 11.1 8.9 7.1
Highest average user 32.5 39.2 44.8 35.2 20.0 17.3 18.4 15.3 14.1 13.0
Gini coefficient of average
agent uses
0.195 0.262 0.234 0.265 0.109 0.099 0.072 0.044 0.078 0.077
Rank correlation 1st/2nd half 0.917 0.902 0.961 0.966 0.907 0.892 0.926 0.872 0.823 0.858
See notes of Table 2
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Table 4: USE AND INSPECTION ACTIONS
WEAK SANCTION STRONG SANCTION
Inspected? Inspected?
No Yes Totals No Yes Totals
No, ϑ<1 220 162 382 44.2% 2 108 110 25.5%
No, ϑ≥1 152 114 266 30.8% 2 33 35 8.1%
Zero 20 37 57 6.6% 0 0 0 0.0%
CAN YOU INSPECT
THE ACTION
WITH PROFIT?
Yes 27 132 159 18.4% 0 287 287 66.4%
Totals 419 445 864 100% 4 428 432 100%
48.5% 51.5% 100% 0.9% 99.1% 100%
Notes: No agent will request an inspection with a reward parameter ϑ<1 in both the classical and other-regarding agent
models. The reward parameter ϑ is below 1 when xj<12.5 with weak sanctions and xj<7.875 with strong sanctions.
Inspecting is profitable when xj>16 with weak sanctions and when xj>9 with strong sanctions.
Table 5: SUMMARY TABLE FOR INSPECTION DECISIONS
S a n c t i o n   E x p e r i m e n t s WEAK STRONG
Date 0225 0824 0408 0825 0831 0901
WELFARE ANALYSES (% of the maximum rent)
(1)  Fees (deadweight loss) 13.04 8.24 6.64 7.68 17.20 17.04
(2)  Fines (transfers) 14.01 8.90 6.49 6.19 43.39 28.44
Net Rent             (Rent – Fees (1)) 21.63 47.49 61.56 62.47 72.53 81.20
Inspection balance         ((2) – (1)) 1.0 0.7 -0.1 -1.5 26.2 11.4
ANALYSIS BY ACTIONS
Actions inspected on total 75.5% 47.7% 38.4% 44.4% 99.5% 98.6%
             Ratio of inspections undergone over the number
             of zero or positive balance inspections 2.17 2.29 1.48 2.40 1.52 1.46
Inspection “errors” on total actions
Of which:
47.7% 34.3% 25.9% 32.4% 34.3% 31.0%
              Type I error          (share of potentially
              profitable inspections not requested)
0.098 0.167 0.239 0.192 0.000 0.000
              Type II error        (share of potentially non-
              profitable inspections that have been requested)
0.695 0.398 0.281 0.369 0.987 0.957
Notes: Total number of actions in an experiment: 216; maximum rent from use for the group is 324 francs per period;
Balance of an inspection is defined from the standpoint of the agent who asked to inspect: fine collected minus fee paid.
Inspection "errors" is in quote because strictly speaking they are mistakes only from the point of view of a self-interested
agent.
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Table 6: SPITEFUL AGENTS INSPECT MORE THAN ALTRUISTIC AGENTS
        WEAK sanctions        STRONG sanctions
OLS regression          Coefficient   p-value        Coefficient p-value
Dependent variable: Total number of requests of inspections per period
Sample size (without median users): 486 243
Independent variables:
Highest users (dummy variable) 0.34 0.015 -1.23 0.000
Period use of the other agents (x
− i) 0.06 0.000 0.03 0.159
Constant           -5.42 0.000 1.58 0.366
Notes: The classical model predicts insignificant coefficients for the highest users dummy variable. See Figure 5 to
identify the median users whose actions were excluded from the regressions.
Table 1A: COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR DESIGN AND THOSE OF WGO
OUR DESIGN (E=4) WGO (1990)
SO NASH OA MAX SO NASH OA MAX
Total group use (tokens) 72 128 144 400 36 64 72 200
Symmetric individual use (tokens) 9 16 18 50 4.5 8 9 25
Individual earnings per period (in francs) 50.5 26 10 -140 165.5 141 125 -675
Cost of tokens (in francs) -12.5 -30 -35 -115 102.5 85 80 0
Gross Return (in francs) 63 56 45 -25 63 56 45 -675
Individual earnings per period ($) 2.02 1.04 0.4 -5.6 1.655 1.41 1.25 -6.75
Notes: SO=Social optimum, NASH=Classical Nash equilibrium, OA=Open access, MAX= Maximum use allowed.
WGO means Walker, Gardner and Ostrom (1990).
Table 2A: SUMMARY TABLE FOR WGO
E x p e r i m e n t s NO  SANCTION
Experiment number 1 2 3
Experience Yes Yes Yes
Number of periods 20 20 20
Period endowment 50 50 50
Conversion rate ($ per franc) 0.01 0.01 0.01
GROUP USE
Average 138.3 147.5 136.6
Classical Nash equilibrium 128 128 128
Minimum 108 84 116
Maximum 188 230 176
Standard deviation (Sd) 23.25 31.59 18.30
First half Sd/Second half Sd 1.58 2.22 1.56
GROUP EFFICIENCY (% of    maximum rent)
Average Rent 5.30% -28.24% 13.36%
Notes: Original data have been rescaled (i.e. multiplied by two) to make the comparison easier with Table 3.
From Walker, Gardner and Ostrom (WGO, 1990).
